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
15 February 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 February 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

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### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - USSR: The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is providing both Peiping and Moscow with an opportunity to point out that their basic unity remains firm, even though there are indications of disagreement on some points. In speeches, editorials, and even poems prepared for the 14 February celebrations, the Chinese emphasize that mutual adherence to Communist doctrine makes the alliance "an unbreakable fraternal relationship." Peiping's commentary harshly attacked the United States, however, and gave no indication that the Chinese allegiance to Sino-Soviet unity would be extended to include accommodation with Moscow's detente tactics toward the United States. [redacted] (Page 1)

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USSR-Cuba: An agreement for a long-term Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar and the extension of the USSR's usual \$100,000,000 economic development credit indicate a shift from Moscow's attitude of aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime. These agreements and Mikoyan's statement indicating a willingness to supply military materiel to Cuba "if requested" will be viewed with alarm by some other Latin American states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban developments and of Communist influence in the Castro government. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 2) 25X1

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Afghanistan-Pakistan: [redacted] Pakistan has decided to take a strong line in replying to Afghanistan's recent propaganda regarding Pushtoonistan. President Ayub apparently has concluded that in order to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line he must make a show of "firmness," even though continuing to hold out the alternative of friendly cooperation. Recent Pakistani radio attacks [redacted]

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
[redacted] will probably antagonize the Afghans, however, and result in increased tension along the Afghan-Pakistani border.] [redacted] (Page 3)

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### III. THE WEST


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DAILY BRIEF

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OK West Berlin: Labor leaders are threatening a transportation and utility strike which would cripple the city's economy. A decision to strike, scheduled to be put to a vote on 16 February, would lead to a walkout--possibly for several weeks--of 50,000 workers, involving the entire transportation system and most utilities. A strike could bring possible "sympathy" action from East Berlin, such as cutting off the elevated S-Bahn service. [REDACTED] (Page 4)

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DAILY BRIEF

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# I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## Peiping and Moscow Stress Basic Unity

The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is providing both Moscow and Peiping with an opportunity to emphasize their basic unity despite indications of disagreement on some points. Pointing out that mutual adherence to Communist doctrine creates an identity of fundamental interests, the Chinese publicize the alliance as "an unbreakable fraternal relationship."

In its comments on the anniversary, Moscow appears to have taken pains to avoid any suggestion of policy differences such as were contained in Khrushchev's speeches last fall after his return from the United States. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping stressed that both countries have actively and consistently supported each other's foreign policy, and he went so far as to specify the communes as being one factor contributing to the success of Chinese economic efforts.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a Pravda article praising the alliance, said "The many foreign and political activities of our countries are subordinated to the task of ensuring peace and pursuing Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence." This statement was probably intended to convey an impression of unity on basic issues, while allowing for policy variations on issues of primarily regional importance.

The Chinese, however, avoided endorsement of "peaceful coexistence" which would imply an acceptance of Moscow's current detente tactics toward the United States. On the contrary, Chinese commentary attacked the United States as the implacable enemy of both "socialism and peace," repeated the accusations that "US peace gestures are a disguise for war preparations," and stressed the past and future value of the Sino-Soviet alliance for "smashing imperialist intrigues." This final note indicates that Peiping's allegiance to Sino-Soviet unity will not be extended to include accommodation with Khrushchev's efforts to relax tensions with the United States.

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Pakistan Intensifies Propaganda Attacks on Afghan Government

[Pakistan has decided to intensify its replies to Afghanistan's strongly worded Pushtoonistan propaganda attacks. Rawalpindi apparently has concluded that if it is to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line, it must make a show of "firmness" even though it continues to hold out the alternative of friendly cooperation.]

[Pakistan recognizes the need to improve relations with Afghanistan, but it remains impatient with Kabul's policies and questions the value of a conciliatory approach. Afghan Foreign Minister Naim's visit to Rawalpindi in early January failed to improve relations, apparently because Naim felt Ayub's offers of economic cooperation were overshadowed by his allusions to the strength of the Pakistani Army. The fluctuation in Pakistani policy will probably continue, but the tendency to follow the harder line seems to be growing stronger.]

[Pakistan's intensified radio counterattacks,

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will probably increase

Afghan-Pakistani tension, thereby reducing the likelihood of conciliation. Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir, however, believes this language goes beyond his government's intentions, and he apparently intends to try to have it modified.]

[The Pakistani attacks may be partially intended to discredit Afghan-Soviet cooperation in anticipation of Khrushchev's two-day visit to Kabul, scheduled to begin on 29 February. The effect, however, may be to increase Afghan receptivity to any gesture Khrushchev may care to make.]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Crippling Strike Threatened in West Berlin

West Berlin is faced with the possibility of a strike of transportation and utility workers which would affect the city's entire economy. Union leaders, representing 50,000 workers of the city-run public transportation system and utilities (except electric power) as well as of the city government, are planning a strike vote on 16 February in anticipation of deadlocked negotiations by their counterparts in West Germany. The union is demanding a 15-percent wage increase, which the city authorities cannot afford. West Berlin officials have assailed the union leaders' disregard for the city's "special status."

So far there has been no mention of the possible strike in the press or any indication whether the East Berlin Communists would take "solidarity action." In a one-day strike of transportation and utility workers in March 1958, the East Germans halted all service of the S-Bahn (elevated) rail service to West Berlin. Gas and water service was not affected, but in a strike of 36 hours or more, gas and water pressures would drop sufficiently to cause service to be cut off. The union chief claims the strike might last "several weeks," and that the union has financial reserves for two weeks. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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